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ABSTRACT
Jurisdictional mismatch plagues contemporary environmeiTtal 1aw and policy. The division of authority and responsibility for environmental protection between the federal and state govemments lacks any cohesive rationale or justification. The federal govemment regulates in many areas where there is nc clear anaiytical basis for federal involvement. At the saroe time, the federal govemment is relatively absent where a strongeT federal presence could be justified. Conversely, states ere precluded, discouraged, or otherwise inhibited from adopting environment:::d protections where state efforts would be worthwhile. ln addition, state intervention seeps into are8.S where 21. dominant feder.'l.l ro1P vvould be more defensible, This jurisdictional mismatch produces sub-optimal levels of environmental protection, V\lastes regulatory resources, discourages innovation,, and iHhibits the c.doj:;tio,·, ax,C: evolution of more effective environmental protection measures. Environmental protections would be more successfl.tl v/ere responsibility divided between the federal and state governrnents in a more justifiable manner. To address the cw.'!·ent n-:>ismatr;h, the federal govemment should reorient its efforts toward those areas in which the federal govemment possesses an institutional advantage,, due to economies of scaie or where state and local govemments are incapable of addressing environmental problems,. such a~ where there are substantial interstate spillovers.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary federal enviromnental regulations are often faulted for tl;eir excessive rigidity and centraiizatiuii.I 1~s;. equd, if less commonly analyzed, problem with current environmental protection effm1s is the mismatch between the nahlre and scope of environmental problems and the nah1re and scope of those instiiutions charged with solving them. That is, setting aside the choice of specific policy instruments, the cun-ent division of authority and responsibility for environmental protection betvveen the federal and state govemments lacks a coherent rationale. 1\lo particular theory of the proper role of varying levels of govem.n!ent in t:nvironment~il policy ce;n explain the ct.uTent <kvisi,}n. The result is a jurisdictional mismatch in enviromnental policy that compromises the effectiveness of measures intended to pratect t11e environrnent.
The federal govemment regulates in many areas where there is no clear analytical basis for federal regulation. At the .same time, the federal govemment is relatively absent INhere a stronger federal presence could be justified. Conversely, existing federal statutes and regulations often preclude, discourage, or othenNise inhibit state and local govemments from adopting en"lirGn:i-iltT,>:.:,1 protections where state effm-ts would be wmthv-vhile. Yet states are not inactive.
Rather, it appears that state po1icyrn.akers increasingly seek to satisfy their constituents' demand for environmental protection by intervening in areas better left in the hands of the federal govemment. This mismatch between envir01m1ental problems and regulatory responsibility undermints environmental protection and compounds the problems of instrument choice and implementation. It also erodes politiGaJ. accountability for environmenta.l policy.
A claim of jurisdictional mismatch should be pi:emised upon some account c.f !he p·roJ=~er state and fed~st . . cJ tolts in environmental protection. Accordingly, Part I outlines why "ecologies of scale" suggest that many environrnenta! problems should be left in state or local hands. It further identifies some of the benefits of decentralized environmental decision-m<:~.king. }\Jot all environmental concerns are best handled at the state or local level, however. Pari: H identifies and evaluates those considerations which might justify a preference for federal authority over environrnental matters. '~Nhile federalism principles suggest a general presumption in favor of state responsibility for various policy concerns, this presumption may be overcome --;;:her~ there is a distinct and readily identifiable federal interest, su.:h <':~ clir im':Eorstate spiHvver or econmnies of s.:::a1e that prv''ide the federal government -vvith an institutional advantage in addressing particuJar concems. Absent su.:::h considerations, hO'Neve~·, most environmental matters are be2t left in state and local hands. Pmi HI contrasts the proper division of state and federal responsibilities with cunent practice, revealing a widespread "institutional misrnatch." While there is a principled case for an active: federal role in many aspects of environmental policy, the federal government is relatively absent from those areas. At the same time, the federal government is heavily involved in many areas better left in state and local hands. One potential impact of such mismatch is greater state involvement in matters properly addressed at the federal level. The institutional mismatch within environmental policy cannot be fixed overnight. This article concludes by suggesting some modest steps that could be taken to begin reorienting federal efforts toward those areas in which federal action is most needed and that match federal environmental authmity with the greatest t1T'Iiro1m1enta! need.
I. ECOLOGIES OF SCALE
As a general structural matter, it is more efficient and effective to address environmental problems through institutions of equivalent scope as the problem in question.
2 As Professor Esty notes, where the scope of a problem does not match the responsible institution's jurisdiction, "the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little or too much enviromnental protection will be provided."
3 By matching jurisdiction with the scope of a given problem, the institutional stmcture can ensure the greatest "match" between a given problem and the institutional response. Environmental protection efforts are most likely to be optimal where those who bear the costs and reap the benefits of a given policy determine how best, and even whether, to address a given enviromnental concern. This does not mean that all environmental problems should be addressed at the same level, however. Rather, the varying scopes of various environmental problems suggest the need for a "multitier regulatory stmcture that 2 See HENRY 
N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1996) ("[T]he size of a geographic area
affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate govemmentallevel for responding to the pollution.").
3 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996) . Such a jurisdictional mismatch can also create a "regulatory cmmnons." See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatol}' Commons: A Themy of Regulatmy Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 27 (2003) ("Regulatory conunons problems arise where a social ill does not fall squarely within any particular political-legal regime's turf."). Professor Buzbee suggests that the "'regulatory commons problem' creates predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated, but to remain unaddressed, to remain gaps in regulation." Jd. at 5.
tracks the complexity and diversity of environmental problems." 4 The federalist structure of American government supports a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption that any given policy question should be addressed by state governments. 5 This presumption is embodied in the stmcture of the Federal Constitution, which grants the federal govemment limited and emunerated powers while reserving all other matters to the states.
6
For the federal government to act, it must demonstrate that a given policy is within the scope of its enumerated powers. 7 Where the federal government does not act, matters will remain in state hands. 8 This basic Constitutional structure suggests a principle of "subsidiarity" 9 -the principle that problems should be addressed at 4 Esty, supra note 3, at 571. 535, 536-38 (1997) (arguing for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of decentralization" in environmental policy).
6 Those powers not expressly delegated are, as the Tenth Amendment makes explicit, "reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."). 7 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defmed, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."). 8 For further discussion of the application of constitutional-federalism principles to environmental policy, see Jonathan H. (1994) (defming "subsidiarity" as the "notion that action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be achieved"); Huffman, supra note 5, at 1381 (subsidiarity is "the idea that social decision-making should take place at the least centralized level appropriate to the decision in question"). This principle is endorsed in the principles for sustainability of Agenda 21. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ~ 8.5(g), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (calling for national governments to delegate environmental responsibilities "to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective -the lowest level at which they can be practically addressed.
Subsidiarity is particularly appropriate in the context of environmental policy, and leads to the sort of "multitier regulatory structure" that Professor Esty suggests.
10
Because most environmental problems are local or regional in nature, 11 there is a strong case that most (though not all) environmental problems should be addressed at the state and localleve1.
12 Given the nature of this nation's federalist system, this approach would entail allocating responsibility for most environmental problems to state governments with the hope, if not the expectation, that state governments would leave ma:p.y concerns to local or regional authorities.
13
There are additional policy reasons to s~pport a general presumption in favor of state and local responsibility for environmental concems.
14 An overly centralized environmental action").
10 This is not meant to suggest that Professor Esty would endorse all of this author's analysis. To the contrary, while Professor Esty endorses a similar framework, he endorses a greater level of federal enviroiUnental regulation than does this author. Compare Esty, supra note 3, at 571, and Adler, supra note 1. 11 See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27 ("The environmental harm caused by the emission of the same amount of pollution can vary widely, depending on local environmental conditions.").
12 See Bradley C. [W] here environmental quality is basically a local public good, the case for the setting of environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of government is quite compelling."). 13 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 223 (2005) ("State governments should similarly leave the making of most pollution-control laws to local governments unless the latter lack institutional competence."). It is fair to note that environmental problems rarely respect jurisdiCtional boundaries, an:d existing political subdivisions do not track ecological boundaries. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 212 ("Conventional territorially delimited lines of authority are, almost without exception, drawn in near total disregard of ecological boundaries .... "). Moreover, the relevant ecological boundaries will vary given the particular ecological concern. Airsheds, watersheds, and terrestrial ecosystem will rarely be mutually overlapping. As a legal and political matter, however, we are in some sense "stuck" with existing political subdivisions although states and local governments may, in some cases, be capable to create intermediary institutions with jurisdictional authority that traces given environmental concerns.
14 See Huffinan, supra note 5, at 1381 (Although "the principle of [Volume 14 regulatory system is itself an "affront to nature."
15 Ecological systems vary tremendously from one place to the next. The failure to take into account local environmental conditions-let alone local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions-leads to "one size fits all" policies that fit few areas well, if at all. 16 For example, an apple orchard in Washington State has different requirements than · an orchard in upstate New York because effective pest control strategies will vary depending with differences in climate, topography and local conditions. 17 Federal mandates that municipalities treat stormwater like industrial pollution discharges or require double liners for landfills may make sense in the northeast, but such requirements are "ill-suited to arid regions" with little rainfall or clay-based soils.
18 Requiring secondary wastewater treatment makes sense in many cities, but adds little value in coastal communities. 19 Even where states and localities have flexibility in selecting the means of meeting a given subsidiarity ... does not insist that centralization is never appropriate," it also "reflects a presumption in favor of decentralization."); Revesz, supra note 5, at 536-38 (providing reasons for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of decentralization" in environmental policy). 15 Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997J ("There is recognition that homogenous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems often yield high costs and weak results."). While, as a theoretical matter, federal regulation could take into account regional variation, "federal regulation generally imposes uniform requirements throughout the country" and, where variable standards exist, it is not due to regional environmental differences.
federal environmental goal, the impositiOn of uniform environmental standards may still "conflict with practicalities on the ground in particular jurisdictions." 20 In addition to allowing for a closer fit between local ecological conditions and environmental policies, a suitably decentralized regulatory system provides several other advantages?
1 First, the ecological and economic diversity of the nation requires local lmowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the federalleve1.
22 A more decentralized system is better able to overcome this "knowledge problem," 23 and ensure that regulatory measures take account of local conditions. 24 Second, decentralization, and the resulting policy experimentation and interjurisdictional competition, can encotrrage policy innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other demands of their constifuents. 519-20 (1945) (detailing the economic problem resulting from "the fact that the lmowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory lmowledge which all the separate individuals possess"). 24 See FARBER, supra note 1, at 180 ("By decentralizing environmental decision-making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing circumstances and new information."). 25 See generally Charles M. In sum, there is a strong case for a general presumption in favor of decentralization-a presumption that can be overcome in any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for federal intervention. Where such a justification for federal action is lacking, however, localized control of environmental policy will produce enviromnental measures that are more likely to reflect the preferences and needs of those who will be most affected by them.
J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and econom.ic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Huffinan , supra note 5, at 1393 ("As a simple matter of arithmetic, an individual vote carries more weight in a small democratic polity than in a large one."); BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 7 ("Allocation to local governments of regulatory authority over local extemalities allows decisions to be made by the representatives of the decisions who benefit the most and pay the most for higher environmental quality."). 30 See Barry A default rule in favor of decentralization takes advantage of the "ecologies of scale" in environmental policy.
Yet such a preference is only a default rule, and there are several potential justifications for federal intervention, to which this article now turns.
II. BASES FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A preference for subsidiarity does not mean there should be no federal environmental regulation.
At most it creates a rebuttable presumption toward decentralization-a presumption that can be overcome with a demonstration that more centralized action is necessary or likely to produce a more optimal result. 31 Specifically, it suggests that there should be an identifiable federal interest, or some reason to believe that state and local governments will be systematically incapable or unwilling to adopt publicly desired environmental measures, before the federal government gets involved. Although such a division of authority is not mandated by the Constitution, it is ge~erally consistent with the federalist principles embodied in the nation's founding document.
32
Following are some of the bases upon which one could argue for federal intervention in environmental matters. Each is analytically distinct and, as detailed below, some bases are far stronger than others. For instance, while the argument for federal action to address interstate spillovers is unimpeachable, claims that federal regulation is necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom" are questionable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. While there is some overlap in the categories below, they are nonetheless helpful in evaluating the relative strength of arguments for federal involvement in various environmental concerns. Further, they can be used to help identify what sort of federal intervention is most likely to produce, or at least approach, the optimal environmental result. The sort of federal intervention best suited to controlling 31 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 536-38. 32 As noted earlier, this principle underlies the basic federalist structure of the Constitution, under which the federal . government is delegated limited, enumerated powers, whereas the states retain all powers not delegated to the federal government or barred by other constitutional provisions. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For example, state governments retain a plenary police power to prevent nuisances and protect the health, welfare and morals of their citizenry, whereas the federal government has no such power. interstate spillovers, for example, may not be the sort of federal intervention most likely to prevent a welfare-reducing "race-tothe-bottom," and vice-versa.
A. Interstate Spillovers
The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the context of interstate spillovers, such as when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict on their own. 33 While interstate spillovers are a real concern, a caveat is in order. Most transboundary pollution problems remain rather localized in scope. Ozone-forming emissions in southeastern Pennsylvania certainly affect air quality in parts ofNew Jersey, but they do not affect Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired utilities in Ohio may increase pollution in upstate New York and Vermont, but they do not harm Tacoma, Washington. Such interstate spillovers may constitute a regional problem, but this does not inherently justify national regulation.
37
In such cases, regional solutions, such as the creation of regional entities or congressionally authorized interstate compacts, may be in order. 38 The same is true in the context of water pollution, where pollution may permeate a regional watershed without affecting the nation as a whole. Adopting uniform national regulations in such contexts can produce the same type of jurisdictional mismatch that occurs when local problems are nationalized.
Not all spillovers take the form of State A externalizing the costs of polluting activities onto State B. In some cases, States A and B share in a common resource, such as a watershed or airshed. The Chesapeake Bay watershed, for example, spans from southern New York down through Virginia and the southern tip of 36 An exception to this problem may be where the harms are reciprocal. In this case, the two jurisdictions each have an incentive to negotiate environmental controls. 37 See Haddock, supra note 34, at 15; see also Revesz, supra note 5, at 541 ("[T]he [interstate externality] rationale calls only for a response specific to the problem."). Maryland.
39
In such contexts the spillover effect is reciprocal, insofar as each state that shares in the common resource has the ability to externalize the effects of its polluting or resourcedepleting activities on the others, and a "tragedy of the commons" is likely to result. 40 As with the more direct spillover, however, one cannot reasonably expect states, acting alone, to adopt welfare-enhancing environmental protections as the regulating state will bear a disproportionate share of the costs from such regulation with no guarantee of reaping proportionate benefits. Some form of federal intervention, whether it be direct regulation or dispute resolution in federal court or some other forum, is necessary to ensure the proper level of environmental protection. Even if the relevant states are capable of negotiating an interstate compact to protect the common resource, 41 federal action would be required to authorize the compact. 42 Similarly, where spillovers are not only interstate, but intemational, there is a justification for federal involvement. Indeed, there would be a justification for international intervention but for the relative absence of effective intemational institutions. 39 
B. National Public Goods
Not all interstate externalities are the result of pollution spillovers. There are also externalities created by the existence of interstate or national "public goods." Insofar as certain ecological resources located in some states provide non-excludable benefits to residents in other states, these goods are likely to be underprovided. Just as private firms in a competitive market may undersupply goods that produce benefits for which they cannot charge, individual states may underproduce environmental goods, such as national parks or species habitat, that provide substantial uncompensated benefits to residents in other states. For example, prairie potholes in South Dakota perform various ecological functions. Some of these functions, such as providing habitat for migratory waterfowl, may provide substantial benefits to residt:;nts of other states for which South Dakota is not compensated. As a result, South Dakota lacks the incentive to provide sufficient protection for prairie potholes. Similarly, insofar as the existence of Yellowstone National Park provides benefits to all American citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated, Wyoming and Montana lack sufficient incentive to invest in conserving the park. 43 Recent empirical research finds some evidence that states free-ride and underinvest in conservation of species habitat where the benefits of such action would accrue, at least in part, to other states. 44 The existence of national public goods may justify federal action. Yet beyond that which might be necessary to protect a public good from external harm, 45 the mere existence of such a public good does not necessarily justify federal regulation. The traditional means by which governments at any level provide for public goods is through their power to tax and spend. As a general matter, governments do not require individual landowners to donate their land for use as military installations or parks.
46 43 Of course, to the extent that out-of-state residents benefit from the existence of a park by visiting it, and states can charge for access, this problem is reduced. 44 (2002) . 45 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (2000) (provisions to "to preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality in national parks"). 46 Of course, part of the controversy surrounding "regulatory takings" arises [Volume 14 Rather, the government generates revenue through taxes, bond issues, or some other mechanism and uses some portion of these funds to pay for the provision of the public good in question by acquiring the relevant land parcel, protecting its boundaries, maintaining it, and so on.
47
It should be noted that just because a given environmental amenity meets the traditional economic definition of a public good does not mean that it will not be provided privately, or that governments at any level can be reliedupon to provide an optimal amount of the good in question. Even textbook examples of public goods, such as lighthouses, have been provided privately, 48 as have many environmental amenities, including species habitat.
49 Ducks Unlimited, for example, has conserved over eleven million acres of migratory bird habitat, relying primarily on private donations.
50
The point here is simply that the interstate character of some environmental public goods can provide a theoretical justification from the claim that government regulations require individual landowners to · provide public goods, such as open space or species habitat, at private expense.
See, e.g., Andrew P. for some form of federal intervention.
C. Economies of Scale
Another argument for federal involvement in environmental policy is that there are economies of scale in the provision of certain government function:s. 51 The claim is that it may be more efficient to perform certain functions at the federal level, for the country as a whole, rather than separately in each state. Yet there do not appear to be economies of scale in environmental regulation. Regulations have to be implemented and enforced at the state and local level irrespective of whether they are developed and designed in Washington, D.C.
52
As Professors Butler and Macey conclude, "whatever the economies of scale associated with the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely overwhelmed by the diseconomies of scale in centralized administration."
53 Nonetheless, there may well be economies of scale in other aspects of environmental protection. There are two readily apparent contexts in which economies of scale may justify federal action. First, economies of scale could justify substantial federal support of scientific research, data collection, and technical analyses on environmental issues. Second, economies of scale may justify federal regulation of products bought and sold in interstate commerce.
Scientific Research
There are defmite economies of scale in some types of scientific research that can inform the development of environmental policy at all levels of government. While much of the information required for effective environmental protection is local in nature, much of the relevant scientific knowledge will have nationwide utility. 54 In this respect, much scientific research 51 Economies of scale are a reduction in the per-unit cost of producing agood (or providing a service) due an increase in production. See MIT generated for environmental protection has aspects of a public good. 55 For example, the weather conditions and topographical features that influence ozone formation will vary from place-toplace, but the underlying chemical reactions and effects of ozone on human respiratory systems and other living organisms will not. Insofar as the latter is relevant for environmental policy decisions in all areas affected by ozone pollution, it may be more efficient to conduct such research at the federal level and make it available to those jurisdictions where such information can be put to good use. Were each state required to conduct its own environmental scientific research, there could be much duplication and inefficiency. 56 In addition, there are likely to be scale economies in the resources and technical expertise required for some fonns of scientific research.
Even where a given problem is particularly local in nah1re, such as the protection of a mtmicipal drinking water system, there is still a case for federal research-or at least federally supported and coordinated research-into the risks posed by various contaminants, likely sources of contamination, means of decontamination, and the like. 57 It fmiher makes sense for the federal govenunent to provide at least some "expertise" on the htm1/R1.html ("A federal role is appropriate in those research areas where the benefits of such research are widely dispersed and do not accrue only to those who fund the research."). 55 See Oates, supra note 12, at 20-21 ("Basic lmowledge concerning the nah1re and extent of environmental damages from polluting activities and methods of pollution control are pure public goods on a national (and international) scale . . . . The basic research function and, in addition, the dissemination of information on environmental damages and pollution-control techniques thus has a public-good character that points to a fundamental role for the central government."). 56 See Esty, supra note 3, at 614-15 ("Absent centralized functions, iJ1dependent state regulators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of technical labor."). Of course it is possible that "competition" could iJnprove scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research methodologies to address emerging environmental problems. 57 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 543 ("The economies-of-scale argument is most plausible in the early stages of the regulatory process, particularly with respect to the deterniination of the adverse effects of particular pollutants through risk assessment."); see also Not all research and data collection should be conducted at the federal level, however. Some research and data collection is probably best left in state and local hands. In some cases, overcentralization of scientific research may increase the risks of political manipulation of science. Professor Esty, for one, makes the case for broad federal involvement in this area, stating that "[i]t makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the level, size, and type of particulates in the air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and other he.alth problems, identify the safe level of einissions, and design cost-effective policy responses." 60 As a general matter, his argument holds tme. However, this argument may also conflate research in which there are likely to be scale economies with local data collection, where the case for federal action will be less strong. Unless one assumes that all localities should adopt the same environmental measures irrespective of their local conditions, it may well make sense for each local jurisdiction to "measure the level, size, and type of particulates in the air," 61 as such data are necessary to help determine whether and what kind of pollution control is warranted. This is not duplicative insofar as different regions have different ecological conditions. Yet even though there is a case for the local collection of data about local conditions, Professor Esty is correct that local research into health effects, safe exposure thresholds, and potential control strategies could be duplicative. Accordingly, such research may be conducted more efficiently at the federal level. Moreover, federal efforts to ensure the consistency and reliability of state and local data collection efforts would maximize the national benefits from such local research, further justifying federal support of local research and data collection. 58 Oates, supra note 12, at 22. 59 See Esty, supra note 3, at 615 (" [T] he smaller the regulating entity, the more likely it is to suffer from the absence of scientific scale economies.").
60 ld. at 614. 61 ld.
Product Standards
There may be economies of scale in some types of regulation that make a single federal standard more efficient than a multiplicity of state standards. Specifically, a single set of regulations may make more sense for a single, integrated national economy.
62
This argument is strongest in the case of product regulation. 63 Where a given product is bought and sold in national markets, and will travel throughout interstate commerce, it is less costly to design and produce the product so as to confonn with a single national standard.
64
While it is not clear why pulp mill siting standards in V ennont should match those in Oregon or Mississippi, if cmmnercial goods are going to be produced on a national scale for national markets, producers may be best served if there is a single product standard that applies nationwide.
65
Facility siting and construction will always be subject to local requirements, but that is not necessarily the case with consumer products. In addition, consumers may benefit from national product standards, insofar as lower compliance costs result in lower consumer prices. Allowing states to adopt more stringent product standards of their own poses the risk of one state extemalizing the costs of its environmental preferences onto outof-state market participants. For instance, if Califomia and several northeastem states adopt more stringent emission standards for 62 See, e.g., NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 17 ("Business interests, not without justification, often prefer nationwide regulatory standards to a hodgepodge of local rules: broad scope and standardization may lower uncertainty and increase efficiency."); SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 218 (defending federal regulation of pesticide safety because pesticides are "nationally distributed"). ) ("Uniform national regulation may produce economies of scale of production and distribution for firms selling nationally."). 64 See, e.g., Oates, supra note 12, at 21 ("It would obviously be very costly for auto manufacturers to have to produce 50 different variants of cars to satisfY the particular emissions standards of each state."). 65 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 173 ("[W]hile automakers and fuel producers prefer national regulatory uniformity, stationary sources have just the opposite interest."). But see, Revesz, supra note 5, at 544 (noting that the argument for uniformity is "less compelling in the case of process standards"); Esty, supra note 3, at 618 (noting federal uniform product standards, but not process standards, "can create important economies of scale for businesses selling these products").
automobiles, and this produces a de facto national standard that increases production costs, consumers in other states may end up bearing a portion of the costs of more polluted states' preference for cleaner vehicles.
66
While this argument has some force, it is likely that it has been oversold. If anything, the costs of meeting a multiplicity of product standards has declined over time. In _the 1970s it was certainly the case that varied state tailpipe emission standards would have increased the cost of automobiles nationwide. At the time, it would have been difficult for a single factory in Detroit to tum out vehicles matching the preferences and requirements of each state. Today, however, in an era of just-in-time inventory and customized manufacturing, it is not clear that' these premises apply. Product customization is increasingly common in many major industries, including automobile manufacture.
67 Consumers regularly order products; such as home computers, tailor-made to their specifications. 68 If products can be produced for individual consumers, production to meet a dozen or more different state standards cannot be much of a problem. 69 Tailoring products to meet state standards does not necessarily require manufacturing 66 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 17 (noting adoption of emission regulations in California may "force" automakers to comply with the standard nationwide "since it is not feasible to produce two separate sets of cars"). 67 See B. JOSEPH PINE II, MASS CUSTOMIZATION: THE NEW FRONTIER IN BUSINESS COMPETITION 36 (1993) ("The entire [automobile production] process, from order to delivery-including production, not just movement from inventory-is heading toward full customization."). "Mass customization generally refers to the manufacture of one-of-a-kind, 'custom' products via the use of flexible, computer-controlled mass-production machinery. 69 This does not mean that mass production of standardized products isn't less expensive due to economies of scale; it certainly is. See PINE, supra note 67, at 47-48 (noting that "the benefits of low prices owing to economies of scale and other cost advantages of mass production are never overcome"). Rather, it is that the marginal cost of tailoring products to different market segments has dropped dramatically, and that the technologies and management structures that allow for mass customization make it feasible and cost-effective to produce state-specific products in many industries.
items from scratch. The emergence of electronic emission controls, for example, could allow manufacturers to tailor vehicle emissions to the particular demands of specific regional markets.
70
Given these technological advances and resulting changes in product markets, state-specific product standards may not necessarily allow one state to externalize the costs of its environmental preferences on another.
71
A related concern is that the proliferation of state product standards will inhibit interstate commerce. A multiplicity of variable mles could sufficiently burden commerce in some goods and services as to become an obstacle to interstate trade. Insofar as states may seek to adopt environmental measures that facially discriminate against out-of-state producers, such measures are already barred by the dormant commerce clause.
72 Additionally, the Pike test further bars those state measures which unduly burden interstate commerce.
73
Whatever the merits of current dormant commerce clause doctrine, so long as courts continue to enforce these prohibitions, the ability of states to dismpt interstate commerce will be limited. Nonetheless, further federal action to encourage uniformity may be justified in some contexts. 70 
D. Race to the Bottom
.One of the more prominent arguments for greater federal intervention is that the lack of a federal regulatory "floor" will result in a destructive "race to the bottom," in which states adopt suboptimally lax environinental protections in a futile effort to attract off-setting levels of economic investment. 74 As commonly explained, this competition creates downward pressure as each state seeks to attract business by reducing its environmental safeguards below the levels maintained by competing jurisdictions. As Professor Richard Stewart observed three decades ago, "[i]f each locality reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there were some binding mechanism that enabled theni simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development." 75 Thus, the theory goes, interstate competition will result in suboptimally lax environmental regulations even where there are not direct spillovers from one jurisdiction into another.
One immediate problem with the race to the bottom theory is its static view of the trade-off between economic development and environmental protection. Insofar as it is possible to reduce the costs of environmental regulation without sacrificing existing levels of environmental protection, government efforts to create a more business-friendly regulatory climate need not produce 74 See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22-25 (2003) (noting that the race-to-the-bottom theory is "one of the central underpinnings of federal environmental regulation"); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting "a widespread belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually destructive 'race to the bottom"'); Esty, supra note 3, at 628 ("Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the central underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United States."). Perhaps the ftrst to suggest the "race to the bottom" justification for federal environmental regulation was Richard Stewart. suboptimal levels of environmental protection. 76 At the same time, business interests often have their own reasons for supporting greater levels of environmental protection, 77 including the effect of environmental conditions on labor supply. States are not only competing for industry, but for workers and taxpayers as well. Moreover, as incomes rise, so does the demand for environmental protection, so states that fail to maintain high levels of environmental protection risk driving away· residents to other states. 78 Additional problems with the race-to-the-bottom theory have been identified by Professor Richard L. Revesz.
79 First, as Revesz points out, there is no reason to assume that interjurisdictional competition in environinental policy is any less likely to produce optimal results or is otherwise less reliable than such competition in other contexts. 80 While it is plausible that interjurisdctional competition could produce suboptimal results due to game theoretic interactions, there is no a priori reason to assume that the result would be state standards that are suboptimally lax, rather than sub optimally stringent. 81 80 See id. at 1211-12. 81 See id. at 1241-42. Advocates of the race-to-the-bottom theory also acknowledge this. point. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 74, at 345 ("[I]t is unclear whether this . strategic interaction prompts states to establish more or less stringent standards."). It is also possible that, in some circumstances, the adoption of a federal regulatory "floor" could result in less state regulation, and "bottom," and that state standards are insufficiently stringent, federal regulation might not solve the problem. Environmental regulation is not the only variable in which states compete for business investment. 82 If a federal standard prevents competition in environmental standards, states will compete in other areas. Indeed, if the race-to-the-bottom argument can justify federal environmental standards, it could justify the federalization of just about everything.
Another problem with the race to the bottom theory, as noted by economist William Fischel, is the dominant role of homeowners in local politics, which can often produce a ''Not in My Back Yard" ("NIMBY") reaction to proposed changes ,in land use. 83 Homeowners tend to be very risk averse about local changes or developments that have the potential to depress land values, and this risk aversion "pervades all of local political decisions. "
84
Even those homeowners who are not particularly concerned about the environmental effects of proposed developments or industrial activities are likely to recognize that prospective buyers might be. 85 As a result, Fischel goes so far as to argue that local governments are "the least likely candidates for a 'race to the bottom' of the environmental ladder" and that "local governments are, if anything, inclined to accept too little garden-variety industry" and other environmentally harmfulland-uses. 86 Theory aside, empirical evidence of a race to the bottom in environmental policy is conspicuously lacking. 87 While there are some studies finding that the stringency of environmental regulation can affect industry siting decisions, 88 cannot sustain the claim that interjurisdictional competitiOn produces suboptimally lax environmental regulation. 90 The fact that many states adopted federal regulation in advance of the federal government, and that in some cases those states with the most to lose from regulation were the first to act, 91 would strongly suggest otherwise. Further evidence suggests that, at least in some environmental contexts, any "race" among jurisdictions is "to the top," as states seem more likely to increase their environmental efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions' actions than to relax regulation.
92 Moreover, some states may rationally opt to reduce environmental protection in one area so as to facilitate greater environmental gains in another context. This is evidence of variable state preferences, not a race to the "bottom" of environmental protection. In short, despite its prominence in environmental policy discussions, the "race-to-the-bottom" theory is not a particularly strong basis upon which to rest the case for federal intervention.
E. Interest Groups and Institutional Competence
There may be other institutional or public choice reasons to expect state and local govemments to be less able to address environmental concems than the federal government, even in the absence of spillovers or economies of scale. For instance, some argue that collective action problems and the threat of special interest influences are greater at the state than federal level. . 91 See, Adler, Wetlands, supra note 49, at 47-53. 92 See Oates, supra note 12, at I 5 ("States appear to be 'pulled' to higher levels of abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighbouring states, but relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such expenditures."); TESKE, supra note 21, at 180-81 (fmding states are more likely to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions taken in neighboring states, and concluding that tllis "suggests that the race to the bottom is not a factor here"); id. at 191-92 (fmding the same pattern in groundwater regulation). 93 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 3, at 597-98; Stewart, supra note 74, at 1213.
~
While there are certainly collective action problems at the state level that inhibit the adoption of environmental measures, there is no reason to assume that such problems are lesser at the national level. If anything, given wide diversity in environmental problems and ~references across the country, the opposite is likely to be true. 4 More important, as with the "race-to-the-bottom" theory, the empirical evidence that states face particularly acute public choice problems is lacking. 95 • ·Whatever the imperfections of state and local governmentsand there are many-these "flawed institutions" were the first to address air pollution and other environmental problems.
96
Historically, state and local governments began to address most major environmentalproblems well before the federal government got into the act. As knowledge and awareness of specific environmental problems and their causes accumulated, state and local governments began to act. In the six years following publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Springn-arguably the book most responsible for awakening the nation's environmental consciousness 98 -states with air pollution laws increased from sixteen to forty-six. 99 This change was driven by a shift in public opinion. For example, the percentage of Americans who believed air pollution to be a serious problem increased from 28 percent in 1965 to 69 percent by 1970.
10° Cities like Pittsburgh adopted local measures to address air quality precisely because the federal government (and, at the time, state governments) was unwilling to act. 101 Interestingly enough, such measures were adopted with the 94 t 108 governmen.
Ill. JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH
Turning to the present state of environmental policy, the division of authority and responsibility in environmental policy does not comport with the analytical framework sketched above. Nor does it comport with any particular analytical framework or theory of the proper federal-state balance in environmental policy. Rather, it is the result of an almost haphazard accretion of regulatory statutes ·over the past several decades. 109 The result is a . mismatch between the analytical bases for federal intervention and the actual contours of federal intervention in environmental policy-a jurisdictional mismatch that is greater than that which would be caused by the failure of legal and political jurisdictions to track the scope and extent of various environmental concerns. This mismatch has significant consequences for environmental protection. It is inefficient and, at times, environmentally harmful. As illustrated by the examples that follow, the jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy has hampered environmental protection in some significant respects.
A. ·Federal Action
The federal government is intensely involved in myriad environmental problems that are truly local in character. Drinking water, underground storage tanks, and hazardous waste sites are all problems that lack the features that would justify . federal regulation, yet federal requirements for such intrastate concerns are sometimes more stringent than mandates to prevent interstate harms. 110 Even where a federal role can be justified, as in the case of air pollution that may drift across jurisdictional lines, the federal 108 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 196 government's involvement does not COITespond with the federal government's interest. For example, cunent federal air quality regulations focus far more on whether a given metropolitan area meets national ambient air quality standards and on the development state plans to meet such standards than on interstate air pollution. 111 Moreover, those provisions targeted at such spillovers have only rarely been invoked with any success.
Regulation of drinking water quality is perhaps the paradigmatic example of a local enviromnental concern regulated under federal law.
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDW A"), the federal government sets maximum thresholds for identified contaminants with which all local water systems must comply.
112
Although variances from federal standards are available in some instances, 113 as a practical matter, the SDW A sets uniform drinking water standards for the entire nation.
Federal drinking water standards cannot be justified on the grounds of interstate spillovers, as drinking water quality in one community seldom, if ever, has an effect upon drinking water in neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away.
114
Both the costs and benefits of more protective standards fall on users of the drinking water system.
115 Accordingly, state and local governments made "significant strides" to improve drinking water 111 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (noting that the State Implementation Plan provisions are the "heart" of the Clean Air Act). As a practical matter, it may be more accurate to say that the primary federal focus is on the existence of State Implementation Plans for meeting the National Ambient ~ protection before the passage of the federal SDW A.
116
While federal standards were adopted, in part, due to concerns that local efforts may have been underprotective, the imposition of nationally uniform drinking water standards may have produced large net welfare losses)
17
Drinking water is a local good produced by local ·water systems, so there are no economies of scale in the setting of uniform national standards. If states lack the expertise to identify the proper contaminant thresholds, it would justify the promulgation of federal guidelines to better inform local decisionmaking.118 It would not, however, justify imposition of a federal rule. Similarly, if state and local governments lack the capacity to monitor and maintain drinking water quality, this could justify financial and technical support from the federal ·government, but not mandatory standards.
119
· Other justifications for federally imposed standards on local drinking water systems are equally unavailing. For instance, were one to accept the race to the bottom theory as a justification for federal environmental regulation generally, it would not justify the federal regulation of drinking water, as the imposition of local drinking water standards does not, in itself, increase compliance costs for local industry. 120 Insofar as local communities adopt less stringent drinking water standards than those who live elsewhere may like, the communities themselves bear the brunt of the risk. A 116 Id. at 27. 117 Id. at 27-28. While recent SDWA reforms may reduce the welfare losses from uniform standards, they will not eliminate them. !d. at 28. 118 See id. at 29. 119 It may also be relevant that bottled water represents an increasing proportion of American water consumption, diminishing the perceived importance of federal regulation in this area. According to the International Bottled Water Association ("IBWA"), per capita annual bottled water consumption increased ten-fold from 1976 to 1999, from 1.6 gallons to 17 gallons. See lNT'L BOTTLED WATER ASSOC., U.S. BOTTLED WATER MARKET VOLUME, GROWTH, CONSUI\1PTION: 1976-1999 {2002), http://www.bottledwater.org/public/BWFactsHome_main.htrn. 120 Under the Federal Superfund statute, drinking water standards can form the basis for waste site cleanup standards, and therefore more stringent drinking water standards could trigger more stringent cleanup requirements. 42 U.S.C.
. This is a function of federal law, however, and not inherent in the regulation of drinking water quality. Moreover, the basic structure of the SDWA was put in place in 1974, years before enactment of the Federal Superfund statute, and therefore could not serve as a justification for the federal presence in this area in the first place.
transient visitor has little to fear from drinking water that local residents ingest 365 days per year.
121
Drinking water is not the only example of a clearly local matter that is regulated by federal law and not justified by interstate spillovers or other multi-jurisdictional concerns. Federal law governs cleanup standards for local waste sites 122 and underground storage tanks, 123 as well as air and water quality concerns that do not cross jurisdictional lines. 124 Indeed, it is fair to say that the bulk of federal environmental regulations on the books concern matters that do not directly address interstate spillovers or benefit from the sort of economies of scale that would justify federal regulation.
B. Federal Abdication
While the federal government is hyperactive in its focus on local environmental concerns, it is less active in those areas where the case for federal involvement is the strongest. The federal government is relatively absent when it comes to addressing interstate spillovers, and it has been deficient in providing the scientific and technical foundation for environmental regulatory efforts. The federal government has been more responsible in efforts to provide for national public goods, such as national parks and the like, though here, too, federal efforts are far from ideal. It chronically underfunds National Park maintenance and restoration, while spending money '\mwisely and even extravagantly" on new constmction. 125 The result is substantial pollution and ecological degradation of national public goods within federal care. 126 Even 121 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 177 ("The water that residents provide for themselves is generally safe for visitors .... Transients drinking water with 50 ppb arsenic are probably at much great~r risk from being killed by a toppling vending machine while buying a soft drink"). where the federal government manages resources that are not necessarily public goods of national importance, the results are distressing. One salient example is the management of the National Forests, where the federal government loses money on timber sales, and chronic mismanagement has led to ecosystem decline and a literally explosive threat of catastrophic wildflre.
127
Federal agencies are also responsible for thousands of contaminated waste sites that will likely cost in excess of $250 billion to clean.
128 Compounding the problems with state and local environmental efforts, federal facilities are not always subject to the same civil penalties for polluting activities as are private facilities. (discussing federal claims of immunity from civil penalties under RCRA and CERCLA).
· Interstate Spillovers
Federal intervention is probably most needed to address interstate spillover concerns. 130 Only a small portion of current federal regulations qan bejustified on these grounds, however.
131
More significantly,· these provisimis have been invoked only rarely, and even then downwind states have been more aggressive at seeking to control interstate spillovers than has the federal government. For over two decades, the EPA made no significant effort to address such concerns, focusing instead on air quality in urban centers. As even those who support a fairly aggressive federal environmental presence acknowledge, the "EPA has not done a very good job of addressing transbotmdary pollution."
132 In some cases, existing federal environmental laws may have exacerbated interstate pollution problems, such as by encouraging the use of taller smoke stacks that will send polluting emissions further downwind.
133
While the Clean Air Act contains a few provisions that specifically address interstate pollution concerns, the EPA has largely ignored these measures. Indeed, where states sought to invoke the Act to obtain relief for upwind contributions to local air pollution, the EPA refused to act, and federal courts largely validated the federal government's desire to ignore interstate air pollution.
134
Only recently has the EPA responded to states seeking to control emissions from upwind states that contribute to downwind nonattainment of federal air quality standards. 135 For over two decades, EPA made no significant effort to address such concerns, focusing instead on air quality in urban centers. 136 ·pollution, but here again the federal government has been largely absent, rarely invoking the relevant provisions.
137
This federal abdication is all the more troubling for state environmental protection efforts as federal statutes largely preempt preexisting remedies for interstate nuisances under federal common law.
138
Policymakers may have ·voiced concerns about interstate externalities when adopting federal environrhental statues, 139 but such concerns are scarcely evident in the environmental provisions of the U.S. Code as they represent only a tiny portion of federal pollution control law.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale suggest that the federal government should actively fund scientific research about environmental problems, collect data, and support the development of pollution control strategies, even if they are not imposed on local jurisdictions. 140 Yet the state of knowledge about environmental problems, their causes and extent, remains quite poor. Much environmental-regulation has proceeded despite a lack of basic data about the nature of current environmental problems and incomplete scientific understanding of the problems in question. These problems are compounded by the politicization and manipulation of science within the regulatory process.
141 While state and local governments could benefit from federal research identifying the nature and causes of various environmental problems, as well as from comparative analyses of potential environmental protection policies, they get far less federal support of this type than is warranted by the economies of scale in scientific research. Given the amount of resources devoted to forcing state and local compliance with federal standards, particularly federal process standards, this deficiency IS 137 See Merrill The Heinz Center report sought to address the lack of reliable and comprehensive environmental data by developing and publishing a series of indicators of ecosystem health. While still underway, this project was hampered by the lack of adequate data, as some or all of the necessary data was missing for nearly 70 percent of the chosen indicators.
145
The report noted there was sufficient data to report nationally on only 58 of the 1 03 chosen indicators;
146 complete data only existed for only thirty-three indicators.
147
Thirty-one indicators had "inadequate data," and fourteen indicators were not repmied at all. 148 In some cases the data was unreliable, inconsistent, or incomplete. In others cases the report suggested the gaps could be filled with relatively little effort. The report concluded that "until and unless these gaps are filled, Americans will not have access to a complete picture of the 'state of the nation's ecosystems."' 149 In other words, after over thirty years of substantial federal environmental regulation, there is no adequate measurement of overall ecosystem health. Other studies confirm the general fmdings of the Heinz Center report. For instance, a recent study conducted for Resources for the Future on the use of science at the EPA, concluded that "the state of environmental science is characterized by a chronic lack of data and a primitive understanding of many biological, physical, and ecological processes."
150 Additionally, "monitoring data" on pollutants are "generally unavailable for most substances," and the "[a]vailable data tend to be sparse, of poor quality, or both."
151
This problem is likely to persist as the percentage of EPA's budget devoted to research has declined substantially since the agency's founding in 1970 . 152 Yet the problem is not merely a lack of data, as EPA scientists "also lack a fundamental mechanistic understanding of how pollutants cause harm."
153 Some of these deficiencies are due to the institutional and political incentives facing EPA officials.
154
For years the Government Accountability Office (formerly known as the General Accounting Office, "GAO") has documented widespread gaps in environmental data and scientific research. In 1995, GAO told Congress about "numerous longstanding problems with EPA's efforts to collect and manage the scientific data that form the basis of regulatory decisions." 157 GAO noted that these problems were "longstanding" and were not confined to one or two isolated program areas. 158 While there have been efforts to address chronic gaps in data and scientific research over the past decade, substantial problems remain. In 1999, GAO reported that the EPA lacks fundamental scientific environmental data concerning various pollutants and their effects on human and ecosystem health. 159 In 2000, GAO concluded that the EPA's national water quality inventory "does not accurately portray water quality conditions nationwide," in large part because data are only collected for a small percentage of the nation's waters. 160 Not only does the EPA not collect sufficient data, but it does not ensure consistency and compatibility across state-collected data. 161 GAO concluded that "the dearth of the waters actually monitored, combined with the wide variation among states' monitoring and assessment approaches, make the national statistics umeliable and subject to misinterpretation and, therefore, of limited usefi.llness .... "
162
These are not isolated findings. A 2003 GAO study reported that "[ n ]o federal entity has comprehensively assessed the availability and use of freshwater to meet the nation's needs in 25 years. " 163 It fi.1rther reported that state water managers believed -that more water data and greater flexibility in complying with federal environmental laws would help states to meet their water resource needs. 164 The National Research Council, a division of the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") likewise reported that "observational networks to measure various water characteristics have been in decline during the last 30 years because of political and fiscal instabilities."
165 This is particularly true for systems monitoring "streamflow, groundwater, sediment transport, water quality and water use." 166 Although the "number, complexity, and severity of water problems are growing," the NAS found that investment in the scientific studies necessary to address such problems has "stagnated." 167 The NAS panel found that too much of current research is focused on short-term concerns and "[t]oo little of it is focused on the kind of fundamental, integrated, longer-term research that will be required if current and emerging water problems are to be addressed successfully."
168
A 2001 report by the National Academy of Public Administration ("NAP A") also found major deficiencies in the EPA's information systems for overseeing and monitoring state and federal environmental program performance. 169 The NAP A report further found that [D] ata from EPA and state systems are hard to use in assessing changes of environmental conditions at specific locations and in evaluating the environmental and compliance performance of individual facilities, groups of facilities, or responsible government agencies. As a result, Congress, EPA, state legislatures, and the public cannot readily evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, or equity of federal and state Similarly, a 2004 GAO report noted significant "gaps" and "duplication of effort" in water quality data.
171
The lack of data can inhibit sound policy formation at all levels of government. In recent litigation over revisions to the EPA's "New Source Review" regulations, the agency was forced to acknowledge that its environmental impact analysis could not "reasonably quantify" the impact of the proposed regulatory changes on public health because the analysis was "based upon incomplete data."
172
GAO likewise concluded that the environmental impact of the mle was "uncertain because oflimited data and difficulty in detennining how industrial companies will respond to the mle."
173
A lack of quality environmental data also makes it difficult to identify environmental baselines for the purpose of measuring environmental progress or decline. In 2004 EPA announced the classification under fish advisories of a record proportion of the nation's rivers and streams due to contamination from mercury and other toxic substances. 174 While there were only 20 fish advisories in 1993, there were 175 by 2001, and 386 by 2003 . 175 Yet the increased number of advisories was not due to any measured increase in water pollution or fish contamination; indeed, emissions of mercury and other contaminants of concern have declined substantially over the same time period that the number of fish advisories skyrocketed. 176 Rather, the increased number of fish advisories was du~ to in part to an increase in water quality testing conducted by environmental agencies. 177 In other words, more rivers and streams were under fish advisories than ever before because more river miles were tested than ever before.
While the federal government invests substantial resources in environmental protection, and enforces a wide array of environmental regulations, these efforts are not focused on those areas in which the case for federal involvement is the strongest. Just as the federal government has failed to address interstate pollution spillovers, it has failed to concentrate federal resources in those areas where federal efforts are most warranted due to economies of scale. This mismatch undermines the effectiveness of federal environmental protection.
IV. STATE-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES
The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy distorts state environmental policymaking and can have significant environmental consequences. As a result of extensive federal involvement in areas best left in state or local hands, state policy development is heavily distorted.
178
The lack of a match between the scope of environmental problems and the political jurisdictions asserting authority over such concerns leads to poor prioritization. The over-centralization of environmental policy further compounds the problem of excessive rigidity created by excessive uniformity. 179 The extension of federal authority into areas more properly left under state and local control does not extinguish the demand for greater environmental protection at the state and local level. It does, however, rechannel it. One consequence of the mismatch is that state and local policy makers increasingly tum to environmental issues and concerns where the case for federal dominance is stronger.
The most obvious way federal action influences state environmental protection efforts is when federal rules preempt conflicting or varying state rules. For example, section 209(b) of since 1990).
177 !d. at 2. Another contributing factor was the increased use of statewide advisories in response to state testing results. !d. 178 The full range of federal regulation's potential effects on state regulatory activity is surveyed in Adler, supra note 81. 179 See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that excessive centralization produces "inflexibility and inertia").
the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles." 180 Similarly, the Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state regulation of automotive fuel economy .
181
Preemption can be express, as in the above examples, or implied. 182 Where implied preemption is found, federal regulation will typically preclude any state or local regulation whatsoever. 183 Because preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity, the net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less regulation than there would have been otherwise. 184 Where federal measures are insufficiently protective, or where federally imposed uniformity is inefficient, there will be suboptimal results. As a recent environmental group report concluded, " [ f] ederal preemption of states' ability to go above and beyond the federal floor suppresses states' creativity in developing new approaches to solving public policy problems, such as air pollution." 185 Sometimes federal preemption may be justified by economies of scale. In other cases, however, preemption precludes the adoption of state-level standards that are more tailored to local or regional conditions and needs.
As a practical matter, a federal regulatory "floor" can become a ceiling. The existence of a federal standard may discourage state policyrnakers from adopting and maintaining more stringent measures of their own, even where such measures could be justified. Many states have adopted legislation to prevent state environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that are more protective than federal rules. 186 New Mexico and Colorado, for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation of air pollution controls more stringent than what would be required by federal law. 187 Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than mandated under the federal Clean Water Act. 188 Others states have general prohibitions against agency promulgation of environmental rules more stringent than federal law. 189 Insofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientific assessments of environmental problems, and such information about the nature and extent of environmental problems is not available to state and local policymakers, the federal regulation may have an even greater distorting effect on state priorities.
The mere existence of a federally mandated,_ floor also preempts contrary state policies and environmental priorities. If a local community has different health and environment-related regulatory priorities, it still must meet the requirements of federal law. 190 In 2000, for example, the outgoing Clinton Administration proposed lowering the federal standard for arsenic in drinking [Volume 14 water from 50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb ), largely to reduce the risk of bladder cancer from arsenic consumption. 191 While the leaders of national environmental groups cheered the proposed reduction in the federal arsenic standard, many communities faced with high compliance costs were less enthusiastic. 192 In Los Lunas, New Mexico groundwater naturally contains 12-19 ppb of arsenic. Local officials estimated that reducing arsenic levels to the new 10 ppb standard would cost $14 million. 193 Local experts also noted that while New Mexico has among the highest natural concentrations of arsenic in groundwater in the country, it also has among the lowest rates of bladder cancer, leading many to question whether spending millions to reduce local arsenic levels was the most cost-effective way to safeguard public health. 194 There is even evidence that the federal arsenic rule will increase risks to public health in some communities insofar as the higher water rates necessary to pay for the change induces some families to opt for water from their own wells. 195 Yet insofar as residents of Los Lunas, or any other community, wish to adopt different drinking water standards that are more in line with their environmental and public health needs, and lack the resources to pursue every laudable public health or environmental goal, the federal standard precludes them from acting on their preferences.
While the federal government may preempt state regulatory action, and may require state compliance with a general regulatory scheme that does not target states-as-states, it cannot force states to adopt federally desired regulations. It can, however, offer various inducements to encourage state "cooperation." The federal government may, for instance, condition funding on state cooperation or threaten to preempt state and local regulations if such measures do not meet federal requirements. This approach is ~typically referred to as "cooperative federalism," 196 though many analysts question whether the relationship can be properly described as "cooperative." 197 Particularly where the consequence of state refusal to cooperate is the imposition of a federal regulatory scheme, the "cooperative federalism" model does not leave much flexibility in the scope and design of regulatory programs.
Even where federal involvement is supposed to be "cooperative," states are often precluded or at least discouraged from adopting environmental policies that would be more efficient or effective at addressing their particular environmental concerns and demands. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the federal government uses the . threat of sanctions to impose federal air pollution control priorities on state governments. Bpecifically, the threatened loss of highway flli1ds induces states to adopt that mix of air pollution control measures preferred by federal policymakers, even when an alternative mix of pollution control measures may produce greater environmental results.
The adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental earlier measures had similar effects. For instance, air pollution control provisions adopted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal producers at the expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a result. 202 Federal inaction can alter state environmental policy priorities just as much as federal action. In some cases, federal failure to conduct scientific research leaves states without the scientific and technical information necessary to set environmental priorities in accordance with local preferences.
The failure of federal policymakers to address new or emerging environmental concerns has encouraged states to become more aggressive in their approach to such problems. 203 New York State, for example, sought to restrict the sale of sulfur-dioxide emission credits under the Clean Air Act due to concerns that such sales could increase pollution within the state. 204 Yet because the federal government is disproportionately active in those areas where there is no strong case for federal involvement, states may be disproportionately active in those areas where federal action, and perhaps even federal preemption, would be preferable.
Global climate change policy is a prime example of increasing state activity where federal action would provide for a greater jurisdictional match. In recent years, state governments have become quite active on climate change, both for and against greater action to control greenhouse gas emissions. 205 As of 2004,
